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PROPORTIONALITY AND PAROLE 
RICHARD A. BIERSCHBACH† 
Commentators analyzing the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in  
Graham v. Florida, which prohibited sentences of life without parole for juve-
niles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, have generally done so in substantive 
proportionality terms, ignoring or downplaying parole in the process.  This Article 
challenges that approach, focusing on the intersection of proportionality and 
parole as a jumping-off point.  Taking parole seriously makes clear that  
Graham is difficult to understand solely in terms of substantive proportionality 
concepts like individual culpability and punishment severity.  Instead, the deci-
sion can be seen as establishing a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, one 
that links the validity of punishment to the institutional structure of sentencing.  
By requiring the State to revisit its first-order sentencing judgments at a later 
point in time, Graham mandates a procedural space for granular, individual-
ized, and ultimately more reliable sentencing determinations. I expose this pro-
cedural and institutional side of parole’s constitutional significance, situate it 
within the constitutional landscape of sentencing, and sketch some of its impli-
cations for the future of sentencing regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida prohibited sentenc-
ing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life in prison without the possi-
bility of parole,1 commentators hailed the case as a watershed deci-
decision.2  Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges to sentences 
of imprisonment, long viewed as dead,3 had been resurrected.  Legal 
scholars have showered attention on Graham in the two years since it 
was decided.4  But despite an ever-expanding literature, the signifi-
cance of parole to the decision remains almost entirely unexplored.5 
 
1 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., John “Evan” Gibbs, Jurisprudential Juxtaposition:  Application of Graham v. 
Florida to Adult Sentences, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 957 (2011) (characterizing Graham 
as a “landmark decision” that “breathed new life” into proportionality analysis); Scott R. 
Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole:  An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law 
Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 409-10 (2011) (“The decision is unques-
tionably landmark . . . .”); Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without 
Parole?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1-2 (2010) (noting the large volume of expert commen-
tary on Graham within five months of the decision and that “Graham adopted a new meth-
odology for reviewing Eighth Amendment challenges to noncapital sentences”). 
 
3 Before Graham, outside of the capital punishment context, “the Court . . . treated 
the proportionality requirement as so undemanding as to be nearly meaningless.”  
O’Hear, supra note 2, at 2; see also John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Pro-
portionality:  A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 80 (2010) (“It is 
time . . . to pronounce the body of Eighth Amendment quantitative proportionality 
dead . . . .”). 
4 See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 
71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010); Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 
49 (2010); Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All:  Graham v. Florida and the 
Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011); William 
W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death:   The Argument for According 
Life Without Parole Its Own Category of Heightened Review Under the Eighth Amendment After 
Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010); Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Flori-
da:  Justice Kennedy’s Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 66 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012); 
Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—And Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010); Gibbs, 
supra note 2; Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58 
(2010); Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23 
FED. SENT’G REP. 62 (2010); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. 
Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011); Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham—
Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 67 
(2010); Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 367 (2010); Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. 
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On one level, this is mystifying.  After all, parole was the distin-
guishing factor in Graham between a constitutional and unconstitu-
tional life sentence.  On another level, it is hardly shocking.  Criminal 
law scholarship has long neglected parole and other “back-end”  
sentencing mechanisms.6  This is due in large part to criminal law theo-
rists’ traditional view of sentencing as an overwhelmingly substantive 
concern, divorced from questions of procedural or institutional design.7  
 
SENT’G REP. 75 (2010); Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”:  
Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327; 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In:  The Supreme Court 
Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportion-
ality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading 
Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 209, 215-19 (2010); Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t 
Know Why It Is That You Threw Your Life Away”:  Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35 (2010); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song:  Graham 
v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IM-
PRESSIONS 86 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/smithcohen.pdf. 
5 Alice Ristroph is the only scholar to have touched on the issue, and she has done 
so only briefly.  See Ristroph, supra note 4, at 76 (addressing the potential relevance of 
parole ineligibility to punishment severity under the Eighth Amendment).  For a review 
and critique of Ristroph’s discussion, see infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
6 See Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1307, 1307 (2007) (“Largely concealed from the public eye, components of hidden 
sentencing such as probation, parole, and post-release supervision have been ignored 
by both scholars and policy-makers.”); Jeremy Travis & Kirsten Christiansen, Failed 
Reentry:  The Challenges of Back-End Sentencing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 
249-50 (2006) (noting that back-end sentencing “has largely escaped the attention of 
scholars, advocates, legislators and analysts”).  Recent and insightful exceptions can be 
found in the work of David Ball, Steven Chanenson, and Michael O’Hear.  See W. David 
Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel:  Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentences, and the Meaning of 
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (2009) [hereinafter Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and 
Cruel]; W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 395 
(2011) [hereinafter Ball, Normative Elements]; Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above 
and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 186-89 (2005) [hereinafter Chanenson, Guidance from 
Above]; Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 432-
40 (2005) [hereinafter Chanenson, The Next Era]; Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilita-
tion:  A New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247 (2011). 
7 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006) (noting that “structural and procedural principles for sen-
tencing have rarely received sustained attention”).  A noteworthy exception to this is 
the explosion of recent scholarship on the implications of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), for the institutional design of sentencing.  See, e.g., Ball, Heinous,  
Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6; Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional 
Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2002); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s  
Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297; Douglas A. Berman, Should Juries Be the Guide for Adven-
tures Through Apprendi-Land?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 65 (2009), http:// 
www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/65_Berman.pdf. 
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Sentencing has largely been treated as a static, unitary act of punish-
ment, the validity of which can be judged at the moment the sentenc-
ing gavel falls.  Because courts and academics widely view Eighth 
Amendment proportionality as a substantive sentencing principle, the-
se same tendencies—the tendency to evaluate sentences at a single 
slice in time, and by reference to familiar substantive debates about 
culpability, punishment severity, and how well a sentence deters, inca-
pacitates, rehabilitates, and delivers retribution—dominate doctrine 
and scholarship in that area as well.  Commentators, taking their cues 
from the Court, have thus seen Graham as an extension of the substan-
tive proportionality principles of cases like Roper v. Simmons 8 and Atkins 
v. Virginia.9  They have analyzed Graham as a substantive rule, ignoring 
or downplaying parole in the process.10 
This Article challenges that approach, focusing on the parole-
proportionality intersection as a jumping-off point.  Doing so is fruitful 
because, as this Article shows, the intersection of parole and propor-
tionality strikes at the heart of the larger substance-procedure divide 
that infects sentencing law generally.  By substance-procedure divide, I 
mean the divide between questions concerning the “what” and “why” 
of sentences (what sentence may be imposed, and why), on the one 
hand, and questions concerning the “how” and “who” of sentences 
(how do we make sentencing decisions, and who sentences), on the 
other.  The former concerns the substantive results of sentences; the 
latter concerns the procedural rules that govern sentencing.  Taking 
parole seriously makes clear that Graham cannot be understood solely—
or even primarily—as a purely substantive limit on punishment, con-
cerned only with the question of “what.”  Instead, it makes sense to see 
Graham as equally concerned with the question of “how.”  The decision 
establishes a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, one that links 
the validity of punishment to the institutional structure of sentencing.  
By requiring the State to revisit its first-order sentencing judgments at 
a later point in time, Graham mandates a procedural space for granu-
lar, textured, and ultimately more reliable sentencing determinations.  
In doing so, it underscores the importance of institutional design to 
 
8 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
9 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
10 See sources cited supra note 4.  Indeed, not one sustained examination of the role 
of parole in Graham exists in an entire Federal Sentencing Reporter issue devoted to the 
Graham decision.  See generally Life Without Parole, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2010). 
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the constitutional regulation of punishment beyond the Sixth 
Amendment context of Apprendi v. New Jersey.11 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I sets 
out parole’s puzzle for proportionality and explains the limits of view-
ing Graham—and the Eighth Amendment significance of parole—
through a classic proportionality lens.  Part II explores the overlooked 
procedural and institutional side of Graham.  It shows how the interac-
tion of substance and procedure that drives the constitutional signifi-
cance of parole makes Graham more the cousin of Woodson v. North 
Carolina,12 Lockett v. Ohio,13 and other “super due process for death” 
cases than that of Roper, Atkins, and other proportionality cases.  Like 
Graham, and unlike Roper and Atkins, those cases do not foreclose any 
actual punishment; rather, they aim at morally reliable sentences by 
laying down a procedural requirement of individualized, textured sen-
tencing, roughly analogous to how parole functions in Graham.  Part 
III sketches some implications of this account.  Recognizing parole’s 
procedural significance illuminates how Graham continues Apprendi’s 
project of linking institutional design to punishment legitimacy, 
breaks down traditional barriers within sentencing, and lays the foun-
dation for the increased importance of sentencing explanations at the 
back end of the sentencing process.  
I.  PAROLE AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Parole presents a puzzle for proportionality.  Proportionality es-
chews any one purpose of punishment and weighs the severity of sen-
tences against the characteristics of the offense and the offender at the 
time of the offense.  Parole turns on notions of rehabilitation and risk-
management and involves highly discretionary release decisions based 
heavily on post-offense developments.  This Part shows how mixing the 
two scrambles conventional proportionality principles for concepts 
like culpability and punishment severity.  Section I.A provides a brief 
definitional, historical, and constitutional context of parole.  Using 
 
11 See 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires any 
fact other than the fact of a prior conviction that increases a sentence beyond the  
prescribed statutory maximum to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt). 
12 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
13 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
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Graham as a foil, Section I.B explores the difficulties with trying to fit 
the constitutional significance of parole into the proportionality box. 
A.  Parole in Context 
“Parole” has multiple meanings, but I use it here in a particular 
way—as did the Court in Graham—as referring to a discretionary early 
release decision, made by a parole board or similar authority, based 
upon its review of an individual prisoner’s circumstances.14  When 
American criminal justice reformers introduced this vision of parole 
over a century ago, rehabilitation was the dominant approach to sen-
tencing and corrections.15  In the indeterminate sentencing regimes of 
the time, parole boards—which were then and still are largely execu-
tive branch agencies—were critical institutional players in determining 
a sentence’s length.16  They did so by deciding on a case-by-case basis 
whether and when each individual offender was ready to be returned 
to the community.17  The factors governing those decisions were broad 
and varied and involved a wide range of both forward- and backward-
looking considerations.  They included things like the offender’s par-
ticipation in prison programs; infractions of prison rules; job opportu-
nities upon release; family ties; the seriousness of the original offense; 
expressions of remorse and repentance; the risk of recidivism; and the 
 
14 Parole can also mean mandatory release, although I do not use the term that way 
in this Article.  Between 1976 and 1999, the fraction of parole releases that were discre-
tionary fell from sixty-five percent to twenty-four percent; in other words, more than 
three-quarters of parole releases are now automatic by operation of law.  JEREMY TRAVIS 
& SARAH LAWRENCE, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES:  THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 4-5 
(2002).  Yet due to the explosion in size of the modern prison population, the absolute 
number of discretionary releases actually increased during that same period.  Id. at 5.  
Whether release is discretionary or mandatory, parole also can refer to an offender’s 
status as having been released and being under parole supervision—i.e., being “pa-
roled” or “on parole.”  Again, I do not use the term that way in this Article. 
15 See Daniel Weiss, California’s Inequitable Parole System:  A Proposal to Reestablish Fair-
ness, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1584 (2005) (“Historically, the rehabilitation and reinte-
gration of the parolee into society were the goals of the parole system.”). 
16 See TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 4 (contrasting discretionary release 
systems that use parole boards with mandatory release systems in which legal rules 
govern release); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2005) (noting parole boards’ historic “broad or plena-
ry authority to release prisoners, subject, usually, only to the maximum prison term set 
by the judge or the legislature”). 
17 See TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing individualized nature of 
parole release decisions); Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More:  Rationality and Release 
Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1994) (comparing a parole 
board’s discretion to that of a judge in sentencing). 
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views of victims, community members, prosecutors, or sentencing 
judges.18  
Parole fell from favor as sentencing discretion came under attack 
in the 1970s, determinate sentencing systems replaced indeterminate 
ones, and retribution replaced rehabilitation as a favored aim of pun-
ishment.19  Modern day parole boards began to focus their release de-
cisions more on managing dangerousness than anything else.20  But 
even then, the individualized, contextual, and ultimately normative 
nature of the inquiry remained the same, with most boards continuing 
to consider some mix of the sorts of factors just described.21  
 
18 See, e.g., DON M. GOTTFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING:  
A POLICY CONTROL METHOD 8, 23 (1978); TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 26 
n.16; Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim:  Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing 
and Parole, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 347, 399 (Michael Tonry 
ed., 2009); Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken:  Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid 
the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913, 933 (2003); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.9 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (listing several post-conviction factors to be considered in 
parole release determinations, such as “any apparent development in [the prisoner’s] 
personality which may promote or hinder his conformity to law” and “the prisoner’s 
conduct in the institution”).  
19 See TRAVIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 2 (“As indeterminate sentencing came 
under scrutiny in the 1970s, so did parole. . . . As the goal of rehabilitation lost support 
and the goals of ‘just deserts’ and retribution found new adherents, parole’s mission to 
support prisoner reintegration was called into question.” (footnote omitted)).  The 
attack on sentencing discretion began in earnest with Judge Marvin Frankel’s famous 
critique of unbridled discretion as a source of massive and unjust sentencing dispari-
ties.  MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). 
20 See Joshua Stengel, Parole’s Function, Purpose, and Role in the Criminal Justice System, 
NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS (Aug. 30, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://community.nicic.gov/ 
blogs/parole/archive/2010/08/30/parole-s-function-purpose-and-role-in-the-criminal-
justice-system.aspx (describing how risk assessment and public safety concerns have begun 
to dominate release decisions); see also, e.g., In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008) 
(“[T]he [California] Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fun-
damental consideration in parole decisions is public safety . . . . Moreover . . . the core 
determination of ‘public safety’ under the statute and corresponding regulations involves 
an assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness.” (citations omitted)); Stewart v. Pa. 
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 714 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (“[T]he legislature 
has sent a message to the Parole Board that public safety is now the paramount issue in 
parole decision-making.”); In re Thomas, 147 Wash. App. 1048, 1049 (2008) (“[The 
statute] directs the ISRB to give public safety considerations the highest priority when 
making parole decisions . . . .”).  
21 See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, NCJ 17003, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 4-14 (1999), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=820 (describing how state boards 
approach parole decisions and listing factors that shape those decisions); Ball, Norma-
tive Elements, supra note 6, at 397-98 (noting that, in California, the information used in 
parole risk assessments includes things like “the offender’s social history, criminal his-
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The deeply discretionary nature of parole release decisions is re-
flected in a constitutional doctrine that commits parole to the virtually 
unfettered judgment of the states and their parole boards.  Courts view 
parole decisions as “equity-type” determinations that involve “predic-
tive judgment[s]” about “what is best both for the individual inmate 
and for the community.”22  They are “discretionary assessment[s] of a 
multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and 
what he may become rather than simply what he has done.”23  Courts 
accordingly afford parole only the most anemic procedural due pro-
cess protections.  Parole release decisions require the most minimal 
opportunity to be heard, the barest statement of reasons, and the 
weakest evidentiary support on appellate review.24  The upshot, as 
David Ball puts it, is that “a parole board is free to deny parole for 
whatever reason, on whatever facts, for however long.”25  There is no 
 
tory, and commitment offense,” and is “centered entirely around the individual prison-
er” (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2281(b) (2010))); id. at 407-08 (observing that 
“[d]esert entwines itself” in the risk release assessments that go into parole decisions 
and that “desert is considered not in the abstract—whether this kind of person deserves 
release—but in the concrete—whether this particular person deserves release”); see also 
Miller v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (App. Div. 2010) (noting the 
parole board’s consideration of “the petitioner’s institutional record, including his 
disciplinary record, program accomplishments, academic achievements, and postre-
lease living arrangements, as well as the violent circumstances of his crime, his criminal 
history, and his continued claim of innocence” in making its release decision (citations 
omitted)).  The data and psychiatric and behavioral science that parole boards use to 
assess these factors have grown much more sophisticated in recent years.  See Shelley L. 
Brown et al., The Dynamic Prediction of Criminal Recidivism:  A Three-Wave Prospective Study, 
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 28-29 (2009) (discussing static and dynamic risk factors used 
to predict criminal recidivism). 
22 Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375 (1987) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates 
of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)). 
23 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Ex-
pert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)). 
24 See, e.g., id. at 16 (describing the constitutional requirements of opportunity to 
be heard and notice of denial); Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6, at 944-
50 (reviewing procedural due process constraints on parole decisionmaking).  To use 
David Ball’s words, the Court’s procedural due process cases addressing parole have 
been “messy” and “underdefined.”  Id. at 944. 
25 Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6, at 944. 
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enforceable substantive constitutional right to parole release.26  States 
can grant or deny parole as they see fit.27 
B.  Parole’s Puzzle for Proportionality 
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Graham.28  The 
decision put parole’s significance to the constitutional regulation of 
punishment at center stage.  Or at least it should have.  Although parole 
was critical to the outcome, the Court barely discussed it.  The Court 
instead folded parole into its “independent judgment” of dispropor-
tionality, which rested on three factors:  lack of “legitimate penological 
justification” for juvenile life without parole,29 juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders’ “limited culpability,”30 and the punishment’s “severity.”31  
 
26 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1983) (“[T]here is no constitu-
tional or inherent right to parole and the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-
time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison despite the undoubted impact of 
such credits on the freedom of inmates.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (observing that 
there is no constitutional entitlement to parole). 
27 See Allen, 482 U.S. at 377 n.8, 378 (“[A] State has no duty to establish a parole sys-
tem or to provide for parole for all categories of convicted persons, and . . . may place 
conditions on parole release.” (citation omitted)); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (noting 
that for discretionary parole release, “there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a 
decision favorable to the individual”).  The Court reaffirmed this principle in a recent 
post-Graham decision.  See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam) 
(“There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before 
the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to 
their prisoners.” (citation omitted)).  States may, however, create a state law entitle-
ment to parole through state statute or regulation.  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-8.  Where a 
state does so, procedural due process protections apply.  Id. at 7. 
28 Terrance Graham had been on probation for earlier crimes that carried a maxi-
mum sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole when, just thirty-four 
days shy of his eighteenth birthday, he committed an armed home burglary.  Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).  A Florida trial judge sentenced him to life with-
out parole for the original crimes, and an intermediate state appellate court affirmed, 
finding that Graham had “rejected his second chance” and that he was incapable of 
rehabilitation.  Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).  The Su-
preme Court reversed, categorically barring sentences of life without parole as dispro-
portionate for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
29 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
30 Id. at 2030. 
31 Id.  I do not mean to dismiss the significance of either the objective prong of 
Graham’s proportionality inquiry or its shift in applying the proportionality test from 
the capital context to the noncapital context—a shift that a prominent commentator 
has rightly characterized as “monumental.”  Barkow, supra note 4, at 50.  But the objec-
tive test, without more, merely reflects existing standards—whether they concern life 
without parole or any other sentencing practice—as expressed in legislative enactments 
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Each of these—penological justifications, culpability, and severity—is a 
classic Eighth Amendment proportionality consideration, and in  
relying on them, the Court hewed closely to the approach it had taken 
five years earlier in Roper.32  By injecting parole into the mix, however, 
Graham scrambled each factor significantly and raised more questions 
than it answered about how parole and proportionality intersect. 
First, take Graham’s point about legitimate penological justifications.  
The “purposes of punishment” test, as this factor has come to be called, 
is based on the Eighth Amendment’s principle of penal agnosticism.33  
Penal agnosticism holds that “the Eighth Amendment does not man-
date adoption of any one penological theory”;34 it is, in other words, 
agnostic with respect to the sentencing practices and punitive goals 
embodied in state laws.  Thus, a sentence is not disproportionate as 
long as it advances “the goals of penal sanctions that have been recog-
nized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and  
rehabilitation.”35  Over the last few decades, the Court and its individ-
ual members have frequently invoked penal agnosticism to uphold 
what by any standard were extremely harsh sentences,36 including, in 
Harmelin, a life sentence without parole for a first-time felon convicted 
of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.37 
 
and state practice.  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 564-68 (2005).  It tells us nothing independent about the relationship of parole to 
substantive proportionality principles.  
32 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, 571; Barkow, supra note 4, at 50 (discussing the central-
ity of Roper to Graham’s reasoning). 
33 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 58-59 (discussing the “purposes of punishment test” 
and stating that the Court has resisted commitment to a specific theory of punishment).  
34 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment).  As Justice O’Connor observed in Ewing v. California, 
decisions about penological purposes are generally seen as legislative choices to which 
reviewing courts owe deference, particularly under principles of federalism.  See 538 U.S. 
11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also id. (“Our traditional deference to legislative 
policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does not mandate 
adoption of any one penological theory.’” (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))). 
35 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (citing Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25). 
36 See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-26; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 
(1980); see also Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman:  Is There a “Rational Understand-
ing” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 290 
(2007) (“In the [Eighth Amendment] morass . . . one theme has remained consistent:  
the Court insists that the Constitution is agnostic when it comes to penological purposes.  
That is, states are free to choose their penal goals and to structure their punitive prac-
tices to achieve those goals.”). 
37 501 U.S. at 961. 
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But, if that is the case, then what is the constitutional problem with 
eliminating a sentencing practice like parole, even for juvenile non-
homicide offenders?  Doing so advances at least some permissible sen-
tencing goals, including incapacitation and deterrence.  It incapacitates 
by keeping young criminals—a number of whom, empirically, will be 
recidivists—off the streets.38  It deters by sending an unmistakable mes-
sage to other potential young offenders—some of whom will be con-
templating serious crimes—that there are no second chances.39  The 
Court has accepted these purposes before as sufficient to uphold what 
might plausibly be seen as equally harsh sentences, including, for ex-
ample, a sentence of twenty-five years to life under California’s “three-
strikes” law for the theft of three golf clubs in Ewing v. California.40  
Ewing stressed that tough recidivist statutes further incapacitation and 
deterrence and that states are free to choose their sentencing goals.41  
Rummel v. Estelle made a similar point when affirming a three-strikes 
life sentence for passing a bad check for $120.75.42  Framed as a sub-
stantive sentencing rule, Graham moves away from these cases by plac-
ing limits on a state’s pursuit of otherwise valid penological ends.  
The conceptual source of those limits, and their relationship to 
parole, is muddy.  The Court glossed over the boundaries of penal ag-
nosticism, noting only that “incapacitation cannot override all other 
considerations.”43  But it never clearly explained what those other con-
siderations were.  The Court’s observation that “life without pa-
 
38 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2053 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Candace Zierdt, The Little 
Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station:  How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 
33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 422 (1999).  
39 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 621 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s contention that the goals 
of retribution and deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18 
is . . . transparently false.”).  Eliminating parole might also advance retributive goals, at 
least under some conceptions of retributivism.  Cf. id. (similiar); Alice Ristroph, Propor-
tionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 315-16 (2005) (discussing 
difficulties with disproving the claim that neither prison nor the death penalty serves 
any retributive purpose for juveniles). 
40 538 U.S. at 30. 
41 Id. at 25-26. 
42 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980); see also id. (noting that the purposes of recidivist 
statutes are deterrence and incapacitation, and that it is “largely within the discretion 
of the punishing jurisdiction” to determine the length of time for which a recidivist 
must be isolated from society). 
43 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 59 (observing that “the 
Court has been trying to avoid engaging with deep philosophical issues about the pur-
poses of punishment and what limitations should be placed on it”). 
Bierschbach FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2012 11:34 AM 
1756 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1745 
role . . . improperly denies . . . a chance to demonstrate growth and 
maturity” did little to illuminate the issue.44  Aside from its obvious fal-
sity—even individuals imprisoned for life can still demonstrate growth 
and maturity, which a number of “lifers” do45—the observation is 
meaningless without a link to some substantive constitutional standard 
for parole, which has never existed and which Graham steadfastly  
refused to create.46 
What drove the Court’s decision in the end was its independent 
judgment on the other two factors, culpability and severity.  It was not 
that incapacitation and deterrence no longer mattered for juveniles.  
It was that marginally advancing those goals by eliminating parole 
could not be justified in light of juveniles’ “diminished moral respon-
sibility” and the harshness of the punishment imposed.47  Graham 
might thus be seen as part of a trend in recent proportionality deci-
sions—including Roper, Atkins, Kennedy v. Louisiana,48 and Panetti v. 
Quarterman49—that suggests the ascendancy of retributive limitations 
on punishment over the Court’s professed agnosticism toward peno-
logical purposes.50  Graham, however, was more of a leap than just  
 
44 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
45 See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Affect Positively the Politics of the 
Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1436 n.32 (1998) (“After a few years, lifers be-
come your better prisoners. . . . They tend to be a calming influence on the younger 
kids, and we have more problems with people serving short terms.” (citation omitted)). 
46 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 57-59 and accompany-
ing text; see also Ristroph, supra note 4, at 76 (observing that the Graham Court framed 
its holding “as a negative right, not a positive one”). 
47 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
48 See 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty for the 
rape of a child). 
49 See 551 U.S. 930, 932 (2007) (reaffirming that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the execution of a mentally incompetent offender and establishing standards and pro-
cedures for determining competency). 
50 For helpful discussions in recent Eighth Amendment scholarship of evidence of 
this trend, see Lee, supra note 4, at 58-60, Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism:  Panetti 
and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1212-15, 1213 n.189 
(2009), Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 79-82, and Steiker, supra note 36, at 294-95.  
See generally Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 677, 737 (2005) (discussing the basic conflict between the purposes of punish-
ment test and retributive limitations on punishment and arguing that “the Eighth 
Amendment places a limitation on how we may pursue the purposes of punishment”).   
Importantly, saying that retributivism trumps penal agnosticism does not render 
the latter a dead letter.  Within retributive constraints, penal agnosticism still rules, and 
states remain free to design punitive institutions and structure sentencing goals as they 
see fit.  See Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law:  A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 465, 477-78 (2004) (distinguishing between theories and ends 
of punishment).  It may well be that the Court is simultaneously agnostic about the 
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another step, because it extended that trend beyond the capital con-
text for the first time. 
Graham’s treatment of culpability and severity likewise upends set-
tled understandings.  As just suggested, culpability and severity are the 
two sides of the retributivist coin:  as embodied in the Eighth Amend-
ment, retributivist limitations on punishment prohibit punishing an 
offender excessively in relation to his culpability.  More specifically, 
they prohibit punishing an offender more severely than other equally 
or more culpable offenders, whatever purposes doing so might serve.51  
Such “negative” or “limiting” retributivism has become an acknowl-
edged mainstay of the Court’s modern proportionality doctrine.52  It was 
the raison d’être behind Roper and Atkins’s categorical holdings that ju-
venile and mentally retarded offenders’ diminished culpability rendered 
death too severe a punishment for their crimes.53  Graham relied on it 
heavily to reach its analogous conclusion for life without parole.54 
In linking negative retributivism to a requirement of parole, how-
ever, the Court did not explain how parole, culpability, and severity 
interrelate.  The answer is far from clear.  Classic retributive culpability 
is static and backward-looking.  It is “concerned only with the offend-
 
ends of punishment a state may pursue, but not agnostic about what is a constitutionally 
permissible theory of and justification for punishment.  Cf. id.  The Court, however, has 
yet to draw that distinction or to explain if that is indeed the case. 
51 See Lee, supra note 50, at 689-91 (outlining the basic Eighth Amendment ap-
proach to retributivism). 
52 Negative retributivism prohibits punishing offenders excessively in relation to 
their culpability.  Positive retributivism, by contrast, requires punishing offenders in 
proportion to their culpability.  Negative retributivism can be of two types:  noncom-
parative and comparative.  Noncomparative negative retributivism measures excessive-
ness in absolute terms; an offender cannot be punished more severely than his 
culpability would warrant, even if all other equally culpable offenders receive the same 
punishment.  Comparative negative retributivism measures excessiveness in relative 
terms; an offender cannot be punished more severely than other equally or more cul-
pable offenders.  I refer only to the comparative variety here, because it is the one most 
evident in the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence and in scholarly treatments of the 
Eighth Amendment.  See id. at 714-20 (reviewing comparative negative retributivism in 
Eighth Amendment cases and highlighting its importance in judicial enforcement of 
retributivism).  For comparisons of negative and positive retributivism, see R.A. DUFF, 
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 11-12 (2001), J.L. Mackie, Retributiv-
ism:  A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 677, 678 ( Joel Feinberg & 
Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991), and Markel, supra note 50, at 1214-16.  
53 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-72 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 317-21 (2002). 
54 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (considering “the culpability 
of the offenders at issue . . . along with the severity of the punishment in question”). 
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er’s wrongful act and the circumstances surrounding it”55—for exam-
ple, the harm caused (or wrong committed), and the offender’s men-
tal state and conduct at the time of the offense.56  Some aspects of 
Graham’s culpability analysis—such as its focus on the moral difference 
between homicide and nonhomicide crimes and juveniles’ develop-
mental immaturity and susceptibility to influence—accorded with that 
conception.57  Others did not.  The Court, for example, made much of 
the “transient” character of juveniles and the “greater possibil-
ity . . . that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”58  Why?  
Postoffense changes in character, expressions of remorse, or repentance 
have little to do with harm, mental state, or conduct at the time of the 
offense.  They thus should not matter to classic retributive culpability.59 
To be sure, they might still matter to some other versions of re-
tributivism, such as character retributivism.60  Under that theory, a 
propensity for change might be relevant to culpability if it could be 
taken as evidence of a less “hardened” character at the time a crime is 
 
55 Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 107 (2004). 
56 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1383, 1408 (2002); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1445 (2004).  
57 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27.  Each of these is at least arguably relevant to cul-
pability at the time of the offense. 
58 Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
59 As Stephen Garvey writes, 
Retributivism holds that punishment is justified when it is deserved. . . . 
[R]etributivism is deontological and backward-looking.  In contrast to forward-
looking consequentialist approaches that justify punishment in the name of 
what might be, retributivism justifies punishment in the name of what has 
been.  Punishment strictly predicated on moral desert is blind to the future.  
Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”:  Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 COR-
NELL L. REV. 989, 1012 (1996); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and 
Mercy (comparing grievance retributivism and character retributivism and explaining 
that a wrongdoer’s repentance should have no effect on the former), in REPENTANCE:  
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 143, 149 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997). 
60 Character retributivism holds that a wrongdoer’s culpability is a function not on-
ly of his wrongful acts, but also of his character.  See Murphy, supra note 59, at 149 (ex-
plaining that under character retributivism, “one’s deserts are a function not merely of 
one’s wrongful act, but also of the ultimate state of one’s character”); Carol S. Steiker, 
Murphy on Mercy:  A Prudential Reconsideration, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 2008, at 
45, 47 (similiar); B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death Sentence:  Why 
Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transfor-
mation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1123-30 (2001) (discussing features of character retrib-
utivism, including the idea that wrongdoers should be punished in proportion to their 
own inner wickedness).  
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committed.61  Roper’s discussion of juveniles’ culpability, on which Gra-
ham explicitly drew, appears to have had such a notion in mind.62 
But if that is the point, then what is the relevance of parole?  If less 
“hardened” juveniles truly are less culpable at the time of the offense 
than are their nonhomicidal adult counterparts, and if the maximum 
allowable punishment for the adults is life imprisonment, then proper 
application of negative retributivism should mean that the juveniles 
cannot be imprisoned for life.  From the standpoint of retributive cul-
pability, a constitutional requirement that we draw out the time frame 
of sentencing by years or decades does not make much sense.  If we 
know everything we need to know about culpability now, then a parole 
board does not need to take a second look later on.  Life imprison-
ment for nonhomicidal juveniles, even through repeated denials of 
parole, should be off the table.63   
Unless, that is, the constitutional significance of parole turns not 
on culpability, but on severity.  A parole-eligible life sentence might 
simply be considered less severe than a parole-ineligible life sentence.  
If that were the case, all else being equal, a (less culpable) juvenile 
 
61 See Murphy, supra note 59, at 151 (observing that for character retributivism, “re-
pentance might well play a crucial role” in determining desert, because “a repentant 
person seems to reveal a better character than an unrepentant person”); Robbins, supra 
note 60, at 1123 (arguing that because “character affects desert,” change in character is 
relevant to punishment deserved). 
62 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their 
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed 
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2016 (emphasizing “Roper’s holding that because juveniles have lessened culpability 
they are less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment” (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 551)); see also Lee, supra note 50, at 724-25 (discussing Roper’s application of negative 
retributivism). 
63 To frame the same point about culpability another way, one might, as Kyron 
Huigens does, distinguish between the two types of culpability involved with classic and 
character retributivism.  Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1196, 1219, 1228-30 (2000).  The culpability of classic retributivism is culpability in 
wrongdoing; it concerns mens rea, the fault elements of offenses, and the wrong com-
mitted.  Id. at 1230-31.  The culpability of character retributivism is culpability of the 
offender; it concerns responsible moral agency and the justness of imposing punish-
ment on individuals who lack agency, such as an insane person or a minor.  Id. at 1238-
39.  If a juvenile can be sentenced to any kind of life imprisonment, with or without 
parole, then he must have sufficient moral agency to make that a just punishment.  But 
as a juvenile ages, he acquires greater moral agency, all things being equal.  As to cul-
pability of the offender, then, a parole board cannot possibly find that a juvenile is less 
deserving of punishment later than he was at the time of sentencing.  And as to culpa-
bility in wrongdoing, the parole board cannot find that the offense was less grave or 
that the juvenile was less at fault in terms of mens rea.  Those things are fixed in history.   
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who received a parole-eligible life sentence would be punished less 
severely than a (more culpable) adult who received a parole-ineligible 
life sentence.  The parole-ineligible sentence as applied to the juvenile 
would be unconstitutional while the parole-eligible one would not be, 
even if the juvenile were never released. 
The Court has suggested before that parole is relevant to severity.  
In Solem v. Helm, the Court struck down an individual sentence of life 
without parole as grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amend-
ment.64  In Rummel v. Estelle, it upheld a sentence of life with the possi-
bility of parole against a similar challenge.65  Language in both cases 
made clear that “the possibility of parole, however slim, serve[d] to 
distinguish” the one sentence from the other.66  Later, in Harmelin, the 
Court went even further, stating that life without parole is “the second 
most severe [sentence] known to the law; but life imprisonment with 
possibility of parole is . . . the third most severe.”67 
Why that is so, however, is not immediately obvious.  Harmelin’s 
statement was a one-off.  Solem and Rummel, on which Graham placed 
substantial weight in its severity analysis, never analyzed the point in 
depth, apparently assuming that it was more or less self-evident.  Aca-
demics, in their neglect of parole, have ignored the issue almost com-
pletely.68  But if severity turns on the maximum punishment an 
offender might suffer—which is how the Court’s proportionality cases 
have generally viewed the issue69—then the mere availability of parole 
should not affect it.  This is particularly true against the backdrop of 
the Court’s consistent deference to states’ discretion on parole deci-
sions.  Graham itself repeatedly insisted that the Eighth Amendment 
“does not require the State to release [a juvenile] offender during his 
 
64 463 U.S. 277, 302-03 (1983). 
65 445 U.S. 263, 280-81, 285 (1980). 
66 Id. at 281; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 (stating that a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole is “far more severe” than a sentence of life with the possibility of 
parole); cf. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81 (stating that a “proper assessment” of a parole-
eligible life sentence “could hardly ignore the possibility that [the offender] will not 
actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life”). 
67 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).  The Court, however, rejected a 
proportionality challenge to the life without parole sentence at issue on the ground that 
categorical proportionality review did not apply outside the capital context.  Id. at 994.  
68 Supra note 5 notes an exception. 
69 See, e.g., Ristroph, supra note 4, at 76-77 (“In nearly all of the Court’s proportion-
ality cases to date, the severity of a prison sentence is simply a question of time—of how 
long the prisoner will remain incarcerated.”). 
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natural life.”70  It is hard to see a difference in severity between a sen-
tence of life without parole and one of life with parole when parole 
release is neither required nor guaranteed.  Absent a constitutional 
mandate imposing substantive conditions for release, offenders sen-
tenced to life with parole can—and often will—still serve a life sen-
tence.71  It is just that the parole board, not the sentencing judge, ulti-
ultimately makes the judgment that they will do so.72  And it does so 
slowly, by degrees, and over time. 
One might respond that parole release need not be guaranteed to 
affect severity.  Parole eligibility by itself could be sufficient to alter the 
severity calculus because, by at least increasing the possibility of re-
lease, it decreases the “expected value” of the sentence.73  Many other 
back-end sentencing variables, however—executive clemency, discipli-
nary and good-time rules, even enhanced appellate rights in capital 
cases—have the same effect.74  Yet none of those factors ever has been 
thought to be constitutionally significant to severity for proportionality 
purposes.  The ever present possibility that a death sentence might be 
commuted, for example, or the fact that only a small percentage of 
death row inmates are actually executed, does not render a death sen-
tence any less severe under the Eighth Amendment.75  Nor, as the 
 
70 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); see also id. (“A State is not re-
quired to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomi-
cide crime.”). 
71 See, e.g., Frase, supra note 4, at 56 (“[D]espite [Graham’s] extended discus-
sion . . . of the diminished culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, it appears 
that they can end up serving life without parole unless, at some point, crime control 
purposes justify release—their diminished culpability and other retributive values based 
on the original offense impose no upper limit on prison time served.”); Ristroph, supra 
note 4, at 77 (noting Graham’s lack of any guarantee of release). 
72 Of course, there may be other, non-proportionality-based reasons to commit the 
decision on life imprisonment to the parole board ex post instead of the sentencing 
judge ex ante.  See infra Part II & Section III.A. 
73 In its most basic form, the expected value of a sentence is the sentence imposed 
multiplied by the probability that it will be served.  See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (developing the 
basic economic model of deterrence).  The expected value of a life sentence without 
parole would be Life x 1.00; the expected value of a life sentence with a one percent 
chance of receiving parole would be Life x 0.99.  All else being equal, the latter is less 
than the former.   
74 E.g., LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ-153858, 
PRISON SENTENCES AND TIME SERVED FOR VIOLENCE 1-2 (1995), available at http:// 
bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/PSATSFV.PDF. 
75 See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition:  Error Rates in Capital Cases, 
1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846-60 (2000) (documenting high attrition rates of 
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Court made clear in both Graham and Solem, does the possibility of 
clemency alter the severity calculus.76  While Graham and Solem at-
tempted to distinguish clemency from parole on grounds of clemen-
cy’s alleged remoteness,77 that claim is of dubious empirical validity,78 
particularly given the broad authority to deny parole that Graham 
claimed to have left intact.79  More to the point, trying to separate pa-
role from other back-end variables based on the remoteness or likeli-
hood of relief does not solve the conceptual problem.  Any differences, 
to the extent they exist, are merely differences of degree, not kind.80  
At a minimum, this approach would still suggest that capital sentences 
in states with standing moratoriums on executions (like Oregon81 and, 
before it repealed the death penalty altogether, Illinois82) should not 
be considered as severe as those in states that have high execution 
 
capital sentences); Ristroph, supra note 4, at 77 n.14 (noting that after Daryl Atkins’s 
successful Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge, he was again sentenced to 
death, but that his death sentence was later commuted).  
76 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (“[T]he remote possibility of 
[executive clemency] does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.” (citation omit-
ted)); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 302-03 (1983) (rejecting the argument that the 
possibility of executive clemency altered the severity of a sentence of life without pa-
role); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (characterizing life with-
out parole as the “second most severe [sentence] known to the law” while 
acknowledging that it preserved “the possibilities of retroactive legislative reduction 
and executive clemency” as “flexible techniques for later reducing [a] sentence” (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
77 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-01. 
78 For example, in California,  
[j]ust six parole-eligible murderers out of several thousand eligible were 
granted parole release during the tenure of Governor Gray Davis; . . . each 
year the parole board finds only three percent of parole-eligible prisoners serv-
ing life sentences suitable for release, and only one percent are actually re-
leased after review by the full parole board and the governor.  
Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 396 (footnotes omitted). 
79 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
80 Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death:  The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1167-73 (2009) (de-
scribing ways in which death and terms-of-years sentences are similar in severity and 
concluding that the differences that do exist do not justify widely disparate treatments 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
81 See Jonathan J. Cooper, Ore. Governor Bans Death Penalty for Rest of Term, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/23/ore-
governor-bans-death-penalty-rest-term (reporting on Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber’s 
decision to issue a reprieve to any prisoner facing execution). 
82 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Improving Criminal Justice:  How Can We 
Make the American Criminal Justice System More Just?, 95 JUDICATURE 59, 59 (2011) (“In Illi-
nois, . . . shocking revelations about innocent men on death row led first to a moratorium 
on executions, and eventually to the abolition of capital punishment altogether.”). 
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rates (like Virginia, Texas, and Oklahoma83).  For parole to affect se-
verity in an “expected value” sense would thus profoundly alter pro-
portionality analysis as we know it.  
Graham’s remaining answer to the severity question—that life 
without parole works “a forfeiture that is irrevocable”84—is just as un-
satisfying.  If “irrevocable” means that no parole board exists to order 
early release, we run into the same problems just mentioned:  in the 
absence of some substantive criteria for how a board must exercise its 
discretion, the existence of a parole board does not guarantee shorter 
sentences, and it is unclear how the possibility of a shorter sentence 
affects severity in any event.  If “irrevocable” means that the punish-
ment is somehow irreversible, final, or incapable of being corrected, 
the point is weaker still.  As Rachel Barkow and Alice Ristroph sepa-
rately observe, there is no way to reverse any portion of any sentence—
be it a death sentence or a term of years—once it has already been 
served.85  To the extent the ability to do so might be relevant to severi-
ty—and it is not immediately clear how it would be—irrevocability of 
this sort does not distinguish death or life without parole from any 
other sentences.86 
We could try to get around some of these problems by looking to 
severity metrics other than sentence length.  Ristroph, one of the few 
scholars who has grappled with the issue, emphasizes the importance 
of hope to severity.87  Graham’s severity discussion pointed out that the 
 
83 See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 227, 238 n.49 (2012) (reporting that, from 2004 to 2009, Texas performed 134 
executions, Ohio performed 25, and Oklahoma performed 22). 
84 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).   
85 See Barkow, supra note 80, at 1174; Ristroph, supra note 4, at 75.  Of course, the 
State could apologize and compensate or make other reparative efforts, but the time 
served is lost forever.  Cf. Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud:  A Retributivist Defense of the 
Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
407, 468 & n.258 (2005).  
86 Offenders serving life without parole have the same rights and abilities as any 
other offender to raise post-conviction challenges.  See generally BRIAN R. MEANS, POST-
CONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 1:1, 12:1, 12:9 (2011 ed.) (reviewing postconviction remedies 
applicable to all offenders); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 28.1-
28.7, at 1333-78 (5th ed. 2009) (same).  
87 See Ristroph, supra note 4.  Outside of the Eighth Amendment context, Adam 
Kolber and other punishment theorists have recently debated whether and how much 
just punishment must take into account an offender’s subjective experience.  See infra 
note 95.  The debate is important, but it does not affect my basic point here, which is 
that any degree-based, subjective approach to assessing punishment severity would sig-
nificantly alter conventional Eighth Amendment principles. 
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denial of parole means the denial of all “hope of restoration,” regard-
less of an offender’s transformation while in prison.88  If severity turns 
not just on sentence length but also on the degree of suffering while 
incarcerated, then one might argue that a sentence of “life with hope-
lessness” is more severe than one of “life with hope”—at least if we  
assume that hope repeatedly dashed is better than hope denied at the 
outset.89  As Ristroph explains, “An offender who is sentenced at 16 
and incarcerated continuously, without parole review, until his death 
at 70 is punished more severely than a second offender who is sen-
tenced at 16, granted multiple opportunities for parole review, and 
consistently denied parole until his death at 70.”90  According to  
Ristroph, “[t]he first offender is denied hope, whereas the second os-
tensibly is not.”91 
Here too, though, we run into difficulties.  First, many legal 
sources of hope exist for prisoners, including gubernatorial pardons, 
good-time credits, probation rules, and prison regulations about visita-
tions from family and friends.92  Should the varying availability of such 
devices among states and localities also factor into the severity calcu-
lus?  Second, if hope matters because it affects offenders’ experience 
of punishment, then, as Ristroph suggests, should not “solitary con-
finement, security classifications, and other dimensions of prison con-
ditions that render a sentence more severe without necessarily 
extending its duration” also be appropriate proportionality considera-
tions?93  Or, third, is the real significance of hope not in its relation-
 
88 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; see also id. (noting that life without parole “‘means 
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; 
it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the 
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Naovarath v. Nevada, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989))); id. at 2032 (“Life in 
prison without the possibility of parole gives . . . no hope.”). 
89 This may well be a questionable assumption.  See William Ruddick, Hope and De-
ception, 13 BIOETHICS 343, 346-47 (1999) (“We cannot assume that ‘it is better to have 
hoped and lost than never to have hoped at all.’”). 
90 Ristroph, supra note 4, at 77. 
91 Id. 
92 Prisoners might also have illegal or extralegal sources of hope, such as hope of 
escape or hope of religious redemption. 
93 See id.; see also DUFF, supra note 52, at 136-37 (noting difficulties with ranking  
severity of punishments); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps:  Can Conditions 
of Confinement Litigation Benefit From Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 76-
79 (2009) (arguing that proportionality principles should apply to conditions of con-
finement); Ristroph, supra note 39, at 276 n.45 (flagging the “weakness in any propor-
tionality analysis that looks only at the length of a prison term”).  It seems intuitively 
correct that severity cannot be measured solely in terms of years spent in prison.  The 
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ship to suffering per se, but in the specific object of the hope that ac-
companies parole—restoration, reconciliation, reintegration?  Perhaps 
it is not the length of the sentence, nor the suffering imposed, but the 
permanent exclusion of an offender as hopelessly outside the moral 
community, or the categorical denial of any chance to redeem one-
self, that tips the severity balance.94  But notice how far we have now 
come from a truly substantive notion of severity:  severity now rises 
and falls with the creation of procedural spaces and opportunities.  
Like release, redemption might still be denied.  It just will be denied 
over time.   
Exactly what counts toward punishment severity under the Eighth 
Amendment is undertheorized, and the field could benefit from more 
attention to questions of this sort.95  The point here is not to show  
 
ultimate severity of capital punishment—which brutally shortens the actual length of 
incarceration—makes that clear.  John Stuart Mill put the point this way: 
What comparison can there really be, in point of severity, between consigning 
a man to the short pang of a rapid death, and immuring him in a living tomb, 
there to linger out what may be a long life in the hardest and most monoto-
nous toil, without any of its alleviation or rewards—debarred from all pleasant 
sights and sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation 
of bodily restraint, or a small improvement of diet?  
21 Apr. 1868, PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1868) 1047 (U.K.)., reprinted in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 271, 272-73 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed. 1972). 
94 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (observing that life without 
parole denies any “chance for reconciliation with society”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding unconstitutional a sentence of denationalization for mili-
tary desertion as “cruel and unusual”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 
(1910) (holding unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual” a sentence of fifteen years plus 
cadena temporal because, among other considerations, it took from the offender the 
hope of seeking “to retrieve his fall from rectitude”); Smith & Cohen, supra note 4, at 
92 (“Graham’s most significant role may be in its recognition of redemption as an 
Eighth Amendment constitutional principle.”). 
95 For instance, does a negative retributivist vision of the Eighth Amendment re-
quire a strictly retributive metric for assessing punishment severity?  If so, what is such a 
metric?  Although theorists have touched on these questions in the past, sustained ex-
amination of them has been lacking, especially as they relate to the Court’s propor-
tionality jurisprudence.  The one notable exception in contemporary punishment 
theory is the recent debate involving John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Chad 
Flanders, Adam Kolber, Dan Markel, and Jonathan Masur over the extent to which we 
should take into account offenders’ subjective experiences when assessing punishment, 
including whether such experiences are relevant to retributive punishment at all.  See 
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan 
Masur, Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2010); Adam 
J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565 (2009); Adam J. 
Kolber, Essay, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009); 
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definitively that parole has no constitutional significance for severity or 
any other aspect of substantive proportionality law.  Rather, the aim is 
to illustrate how much we have to twist and bend conventional propor-
tionality concepts to make parole relevant. 
II.  PAROLE AND PROCEDURE 
Many of the problems described above stem from a confluence of 
substance and procedure.  Because parole guarantees no substantive 
outcomes, injecting parole into sentencing does not prohibit actual 
punishment.  Instead, it provides a procedural mechanism for fine-
tuning sentences on a case-by-case basis over time.  In that sense, pa-
role’s Eighth Amendment significance is at least as much structural 
and systemic as it is substantive.  Part I showed how parole’s procedural 
dimension makes it difficult to fit into a substantive proportionality 
box and, implicitly, how attempting to do so obscures parole’s proce-
dural side.  This Part focuses more squarely on parole’s procedural 
aspects and offers an understanding of its constitutional significance as 
rooted in concerns about reliability and individualized sentencing.  
Although Graham cast its doctrinal position in substantive terms, it 
is closer to a rule of constitutional criminal procedure.  Graham hinged 
the constitutionality of punishment on what is essentially a procedural 
condition.  The most severe punishment for juvenile offenders—life in 
prison—can still be imposed, but only if it is accompanied by the pro-
cedural protection of parole.  Parole thus conceptually severs Graham 
from Roper, Atkins, and other classic proportionality cases on which it 
relied for much of its doctrinal support.96  Despite their obvious simi-
larities, none of those cases linked the constitutionality of punishment 
 
Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts:  The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Re-
tributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907 (2010).  For earlier scholarly forays into the issue, 
see, for example, DUFF, supra note 52, at 136-37, ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND 
SANCTIONS 34-35 (1993), NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 106-10 (1991), Andrew Ash-
worth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 254-61 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 
1998), and Michael Tonry, Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of Punish-
ments, in PENAL THEORY AND PRACTICE:  TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 59, 73 (Anthony Duff et al. eds., 1994). 
96 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death 
penalty for a nonhomicide crime committed against an adult); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its the death penalty for the rape of an adult).   
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to a procedural rule.97  When it came to punishment, those cases drew 
hard and fast substantive lines. 
Graham, in contrast, did not.  Graham mandated a granular, tex-
tured, and open-ended sentencing inquiry for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders.  That inquiry muddles together substantive justifications for 
punishment with procedural checks and balances on the sentencing 
process.  Substantive considerations still matter:  “maturity,”98 “incorri-
gibility,”99 “capacity for change,”100 “depravity,”101 and other offender 
characteristics will continue to inform the sentencing determination.  
But the point is not to foreclose any one sentencing outcome at the 
outset based on those considerations, but to tailor and individualize 
punishment by spreading the exercise of sentencing discretion over 
time and to a larger pool of decisionmakers.  After Graham, a juvenile 
can still grow old and die in prison, but he must receive repeated and 
closer sentencing looks before doing so. 
Graham is not the first time the Court has hinged the constitution-
ality of a punishment on this type of procedural rule.  The Court’s 
seminal line of cases requiring individualized capital sentencing de-
terminations took a similar proceduralist approach.  Beginning with 
Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court invoked the Eighth Amendment 
to strike down various state capital sentencing schemes that prevented 
sentencers from engaging in a “particularized consideration” of the 
offender and the offense.102  Woodson involved a mandatory death pen-
alty statute that required imposition of the death penalty upon convic-
tion for first-degree murder.103  But the cases it spawned quickly came 
to stand for the more general proposition that, as the Court explained 
in Lockett v. Ohio, the sentencer must not be precluded from consider-
 
97 For example, no amount of additional procedure would have rendered the exe-
cution of juveniles lawful in Roper.  See 543 U.S. 551, 568-69 (2005).  The same holds 
true for the executions at issue in Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421, Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002), Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801, and Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.  See generally Steiker, supra 
note 36, at 298 (observing that Roper and Atkins created “substantive limitations” on 
executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded).    
98 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).  
99 Id. at 2054. 
100 Id. at 2030. 
101 Id. at 2054. 
102 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).  
103 See id. at 286 (“A murder which shall be perpetrated by . . . any . . . willful, deliber-
ate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate any . . . felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be 
punished with death.” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975))). 
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ing as a mitigating factor “any of the circumstances of the offense” or 
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record.”104  Together, Wood-
son and Lockett constitutionalized a requirement of textured and gran-
ular sentencing in capital cases.  The Court has applied the 
Woodson/Lockett principle over the years to invalidate state schemes 
that prohibited consideration of a wide range of factors in sentencing, 
including an offender’s social and financial poverty,105 abuse as a 
child,106 mental impairment caused by inhaling gasoline,107 retarda-
tion,108 borderline IQ,109 youth,110 model behavior as a pretrial detainee,111 
and status as a “fond and affectionate uncle.”112 
Graham did not explicitly rely on Woodson and Lockett, and com-
mentators, focused on substantive proportionality doctrine, have over-
looked the connection.  But the parallel is worth exploring because it 
helps illuminate the procedural side of parole’s constitutional signifi-
cance in the decision.  As with Graham, it is hard to tie the particulars 
of the Woodson/Lockett principle to a strictly retributivist Eighth 
Amendment limitation on punishment.  The factors relevant to the 
Woodson/Lockett line of cases mirror those relevant to parole with their 
broad and diverse mix of backward- and forward-looking, retributivist 
and consequentialist considerations.  Some of those factors relate to 
future dangerousness.113  Some concern responsibility for the offense.114  
 
104 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 
476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (“[I]n capital cases ‘the sentencer . . . [may] not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or rec-
ord and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death.’” (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982))).  The statute struck down in 
Lockett, while not a mandatory death penalty statute, restricted the capital sentencer’s 
consideration of mitigating circumstances to only three specified factors.  See 438 U.S. 
at 607 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1975)). 
105 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987). 
106 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16. 
107 Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397. 
108 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). 
109 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1990). 
110 Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370 (1988). 
111 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 14 (1986). 
112 Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397.  See generally Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth 
Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 804-07 (1998) 
(discussing cases applying the Woodson/Lockett individualization rule). 
113 See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987) (requiring consideration of 
evidence of offender’s ability to control violent behavior); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 6-7 (re-
quiring consideration of evidence of offender’s ability to adapt to prison life). 
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Some concern capacity for rehabilitation or potential to contribute to 
society.115  Some reference general good character or moral merit.116  
But all are part of the mitigation inquiry.  As Carol and Jordan Steiker 
and others observe, the Woodson/Lockett principle suggests that “there 
is no substantive limitation at all on a defendant’s ability to present” or 
the sentencer’s discretion to consider mitigating factors when making 
an individualized determination of whether to impose a death sen-
tence.117  Indeed, as Scott Howe notes, the Court has implied that 
where mitigating evidence may be relevant to more than one purpose 
of punishment, the sentencer must be free to consider its impact on 
any of the purposes to which it might relate.118 
While the Court’s failure to articulate a penological theory for the 
individualization requirement has troubled some commentators,119 the 
 
114 See, e.g., Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1357-58 (10th Cir. 1984) (requiring 
consideration of evidence of offender’s limited participation in the crime). 
115 See, e.g., Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7, 455 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (re-
quiring consideration of evidence of offender’s service to the community and the mili-
tary); Miller v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 426, 430-31 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring 
consideration of evidence of offender’s prospects for rehabilitation), vacated sub nom. 
Dugger v. Miller, 480 U.S. 901 (1987).  
116 See, e.g., Coleman, 839 F.2d at 453 n.7, 455 n.8 (requiring consideration of evi-
dence of offender’s general good character); Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 
(11th Cir. 1987) (requiring consideration of evidence of offender’s hardworking nature). 
117 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?  Refining the Individ-
ualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 853 (1992) (reviewing 
BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER:  A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992)); see also Walton v. Ari-
zona, 497 U.S. 639, 663 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (stating that the Eighth Amendment contains no “objective criterion of what is 
mitigating”); Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett 
Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 301-02 (1991) (observing that Lockett’s indi-
vidualization requirement “contains no reference to any particular moral theory or 
theories” and instead embraces a principle of “moral neutrality”); Garvey, supra note 
59, at 1011 (discussing the “laissez-faire character” of the capital sentencing mitigation 
inquiry); Howe, supra note 112, at 809-10 (stating that the “individualization requirement 
calls for an expansive inquiry and almost unfettered sentencer choice”).   
Nor is there any clear substantive standard governing aggravating factors, which 
can and often do include both retributivist and forward-looking, consequentialist con-
siderations.  See Howe, supra note 112, at 834 (noting that the Court has not “required 
that aggravating circumstances focus on offender deserts as opposed to utilitarian ques-
tions” and “has not even required that capital sentencers be advised about the substan-
tive question to be resolved at the sentencing hearing”); Steiker & Steiker, supra, at 
854-55 (discussing the types and functions of aggravating circumstances that capital 
sentencers consider). 
118 See Howe, supra note 112, at 807 & n.49 (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7). 
119 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 117, at 858; see also Garvey, supra note 59, at 
1011; Howe, supra note 112, at 816-18. 
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Court has never seen the particulars of that requirement as a matter of 
substantive punishment theory.  Woodson and Lockett were premised on 
the notion that “the fundamental respect for humanity” inherent in 
the Eighth Amendment required a special degree of reliability in capi-
tal sentencing.120  Reliability necessitated individualization because sen-
tencers could ensure “a just and appropriate sentence” only by 
“consider[ing] the character and record of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of the particular offense.”121  Individualization, 
in turn, required that the sentencer have unfettered choice to consid-
er virtually any mitigating factor offered by the offender.  This granu-
lar approach to sentencing provided a “greater degree of reliability” by 
minimizing the “risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of 
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”122 
The “fundamental weakness”123 of the mandatory sentencing 
schemes that the Woodson Court struck down was their “inability to re-
liably determine that death was the morally appropriate sentence” in 
each case.124  Legislatures, the Court recognized, were ill equipped to 
individualize ex ante through statute.  Exhaustively specifying a defini-
tive, closed, and preweighed set of statutory factors for when death 
should be imposed was impossible and frustrated the fine-grained, 
particularized inquiry that was a “constitutionally indispensable part of 
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”125  Legislatures could 
 
120 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion).   
121 Id. at 304. 
122 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Monge 
v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (“Because the death penalty is unique ‘in both 
its severity and its finality,’ we have recognized an acute need for reliability in capital 
sentencing proceedings.” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977))); 
Butler v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. 932, 933 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (“Recognizing the extraordinary consequences of the capital sentencing 
process, this Court has stressed ‘the need for reliability in the determination that death 
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’  Accordingly, ‘we have invalidated 
procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determina-
tion.’” (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 
(1980))); Bilionis, supra note 117, at 321 (“Lockett is concerned with the ‘unacceptable 
risk’ that the sentencer’s inability or refusal to consider and give effect to mitigating 
evidence might have affected the reliability of its moral judgment.”); Howe, supra note 
112, at 818 (“The argument in favor of the broad individualization mandate is that 
sentencers have the opportunity to consider much more information about the offend-
er . . . and that this additional information will lead them to make better judgments.”). 
123 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291.  
124 Bilionis, supra note 117, at 290. 
125 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) 
(“The futility of attempting to solve the problems of mandatory death penalty statutes 
by narrowing . . . the capital offense stems from [the] rejection of the belief that ‘every 
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still make initial sentencing judgments by laying out categories of 
crimes and aggravating factors that rendered defendants “death-
eligible”; indeed, to protect against the wholly arbitrary and incon-
sistent administration of the death penalty, Furman v. Georgia126 and its 
progeny effectively required that they do so.127  But distrust of legisla-
tures’ ultimate competence to articulate reliable sentencing judgments 
in advance—whether through mandatory death-penalty statutes or 
otherwise—required the final decision on punishment to lie in the 
hands of the sentencer, who was best positioned to evaluate “the  
diverse frailties of humankind.”128 
 
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the 
past life and habits of a particular offender.’” (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 247 (1949))); Bilionis, supra note 117, at 294 (“As Woodson acknowledged, society’s 
rejection of mandatory death penalty statutes manifests an unwillingness to entrust the 
legislatures with the task of formulating a definitive and close-ended moral calculus for 
choosing between life and death.”); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 305, 308 (“[A] judge or jury’s decision to kill is an intensely moral, subjective mat-
ter that seems to defy the designers of general formulas for legal decision.”).   
As the second Justice Harlan famously expressed the point in McGautha v. California:   
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually attempting to 
draft means of channeling capital sentencing discretion have confirmed the 
lesson taught by . . . history . . . . To identify before the fact those characteris-
tics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death pen-
alty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly 
understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which 
are beyond present human ability.  
402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). 
126 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
127 See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (“[Gregg] requires a State to ‘chan-
nel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and 
detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sen-
tence of death.’” (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980))); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (“[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the pen-
alty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a care-
fully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate 
information and guidance.”).  See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts:  Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punish-
ment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361-64, 375-78 (1995) (tracing the evolution of Eighth 
Amendment capital sentencing requirements aimed at promoting consistency). 
128 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 
(1982) (holding that courts cannot prevent capital sentencers from considering “any 
relevant mitigating evidence”).  Numerous commentators and several Justices have 
noted the tension between Furman’s mandate of consistency and nonarbitrariness and 
Woodson’s mandate of individualization.  See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 59, at 1001 nn.48-
49 (collecting articles and cases that illustrate the uneasy relationship between con-
sistency and individualization); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 127 (reviewing develop-
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Similar concerns permeate Graham.  The opinion is rife with refer-
ences to risks that sentencing judgments underlying juvenile life with-
out parole might be inaccurate, untrustworthy, or otherwise 
questionable.129  As in the capital context, some of those risks stem 
from institutional breakdowns in the sentencing process.  As the pro-
cess unfolds, the institutions that channel juveniles toward a sentence 
of life without parole do little reliably to capture only the worst juve-
nile offenders, either because of failures in discretion or inherent limits 
of institutional competence.  At the beginning of the process, legisla-
tures bump up against the same problems just discussed.  Statutes au-
thorizing life without parole paint only in the broadest strokes.  
Offenders are generally eligible if they have committed very serious 
crimes, or are substantial recidivists, or some combination of both; stat-
utes usually make no attempt to tailor beyond such broad categories.130  
A number of jurisdictions even make life without parole mandatory for 
certain serious crimes,131 a practice that Harmelin explicitly upheld.132 
Many legislatures, moreover, may not have fully appreciated the 
consequences for juveniles when they set up these schemes.  Most stat-
utes authorizing punishments of life without parole are general sen-
tencing statutes that apply to criminal prosecutions of adult offenders; 
 
ment of and tensions within constitutional capital punishment doctrine).  I do not 
wade into that issue here. 
129 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (discussing juveniles’ 
transient characters and the difficulty that even experts have distinguishing the “irrepa-
rabl[y] corrupt[]” from the merely “unfortunate” juveniles (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2029 (observing that juveniles’ characteristics make 
judgments of incorrigibility “questionable”). 
130 See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101(c) (West 2002) (“[O]n conviction 
for a fourth time of a crime of violence, a person who has served three separate terms 
of confinement in a correctional facility as a result of three separate convictions of any 
crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.570 (West 2010) (“Notwithstanding the statutory 
maximum sentence or any other provision of this chapter, a persistent offender shall be 
sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of release . . . .”).  
131 See ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT:  THE EX-
PANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 31 (2009) (“[T]here are no sentencing 
options available to judges [of juveniles in criminal courts]; mandatory life sentences 
are required for certain crimes through state statute.  In these cases, one’s young age or 
other mitigating factors cannot be included in determining the appropriate sentence 
length.”); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment:  Imposing Life Without Parole 
on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 691 n.40 (1998) (citing mandatory life with-
out parole statutes). 
132 The petitioner in Harmelin raised both an Eighth Amendment proportionality 
challenge and a Woodson/Lockett individualization challenge.  The Court rejected both.  
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991).  
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they do not target juveniles or juvenile proceedings.133  Juveniles be-
come subject to them only after being “waived” into adult court.  Once 
there, they face the same sentences that could be given to any adult 
offender.134 
Historically, juvenile waiver required an individualized, case-by-
case, judicial determination as an independent check on the prosecu-
tion of juveniles.135  But adult prosecution of juveniles has greatly ex-
panded with the tough-on-crime movement of the last thirty years.136  
Many states now make waiver mandatory for certain crimes.137  Many 
also authorize prosecutorial waiver or direct charging in criminal court 
 
133 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-16(a) (2008) (“Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, a person who is convicted of an offense committed after May 1, 
1993 . . . may be sentenced to . . . imprisonment for life without parole . . . .”); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(b) (2009) (“A person sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole shall not be eligible for parole and shall remain imprisoned under the jurisdic-
tion of the department of corrections during the remainder of his life . . . .”); see also 
sources cited supra note 130. 
134 See NELLIS & KING, supra note 131, at 31 (“Once transferred to the adult court, 
young people face the same sentencing options as adults, including the possibility of sen-
tences to life or life without parole.”); Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death:  Implications of 
Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 16 (2008) (“Once states convict juveniles in criminal court, judges 
sentence them as if they were adults and send them to the same prisons as adults.”). 
135 See, e.g., Hector Linares & Derwyn Bunton, An Open Door to the Criminal Courts:  
Analyzing the Evolution of Louisiana’s System for Juvenile Waiver, 71 LA. L. REV. 191, 196 
(2010) (discussing the individualized waiver standard); Melissa A. Scott, The “Critically 
Important” Decision of Waiving Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:  Who Should Decide?, 50 LOY. L. 
REV. 711, 729 (2004) (explaining that before a judge may transfer a juvenile to a crimi-
nal court, the judge must “examine the juvenile’s amenability to treatment and rehabil-
itation, and the danger the juvenile poses to the public” (citing LA. CHILD CODE ANN. 
art. 862 (2004))). 
136 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II:  Race and the 
“Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 357 (1999) (attributing the sixty-
eight percent increase in judicial waivers between 1988 and 1992 mainly to tough-on-
crime measures); Ellie D. Shefi, Waiving Goodbye:  Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult 
Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 653, 661 (2003) 
(explaining that the “get tough” policies of the 1990s resulted in “easier means of trans-
ferring juveniles to adult court” and “expanded sentencing options”). 
137 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(a) (2008) (restricting the State’s use of  
juvenile delinquency proceedings to cases involving juveniles under age fifteen or juve-
niles under age eighteen whose conduct would have constituted a misdemeanor if 
committed by an adult); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii) (providing exclu-
sive jurisdiction in criminal court over children ages thirteen to seventeen who are 
alleged to have committed certain serious felonies).  See generally Martha June Rossiter, 
Comment, Transferring Children to Adult Criminal Court:  How to Best Protect Our Children 
and Society, 27 J. JUV. L. 123, 126, 128-31 (2006) (reviewing and critiquing mandatory 
waiver laws). 
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in certain circumstances—powers that, far from being used sparingly, 
are routinely exercised as plea-bargaining chips by prosecutors seeking 
maximum leverage.138  The end result of this patchwork of harsh adult 
sentencing statutes and liberal waiver rules is that, as Graham stated, 
“eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole does not indi-
cate that the penalty has been endorsed through deliberate, express, 
and full legislative consideration.”139 
Once the juvenile is in the criminal pipeline, an additional source 
of sentencing risk becomes an issue:  risk that flows from the unique 
characteristics of juveniles.  Some of those characteristics—impulsive-
ness, mistrust of authority, and poor long-term decisionmaking—
create special difficulties for juvenile representation and increase “the 
risk that . . . a court or jury will erroneously conclude that a particular 
juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without parole . . . .”140  
 
138 See Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be 
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime?  A State-by-State Assessment, 
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 806 (2000) (observing that “the state can use the potential 
for transfer and the ability to appeal transfer decisions as a bargaining chip”); Lisa A. 
Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System:  Limiting Juvenile Transfers to 
Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1267 (1996) (discussing the incentives of 
even innocent juveniles to take pleas that will keep them in juvenile court); see also 
Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 249 (Del. 1994) (stating that prosecutorial waiver 
“strip[s] the judiciary of its independent jurisdictional role in the adjudication of chil-
dren”); cf. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2010) (“[D]eference to perceived prosecuto-
rial supremacy is defensible only if, all else equal, the prosecutor is most competent 
institutionally to exercise equitable discretion.  At least when it comes to certain charg-
ing decisions, this is far from clear.”).  
139 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (observing that state legislatures’ authorization of waiver 
for a particular crime “tells us nothing about the judgment these States have made 
regarding the appropriate punishment for . . . youthful offenders” (emphasis omit-
ted)); id. at 850 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that when a 
legislature allows juveniles to be processed through the adult criminal justice system “it 
does not necessarily follow that the legislature[] . . . deliberately concluded that it 
would be appropriate to impose capital punishment on [juveniles]”); Logan, supra note 
131, at 718, 720 (noting “the possibly unanticipated interplay” of waiver and mandatory 
punishment statutes “often contained in disparate sections of a State’s statute books” 
and observing that “it is unclear whether legislators comprehend the actual conse-
quences of their radical measures to overhaul criminal justice”); id. at 721 (concluding 
that “there is scant reason to believe that waiver, in whatever form, serves to winnow in 
any reliable way only those juveniles that should be prosecuted as adults”); Katherine 
Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution:  Transferring Children to Criminal Court in Capi-
tal Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447, 484 (noting that waiver is often based upon “bureau-
cratic rather than individuated concerns which preclude an assessment of the minor’s 
blameworthiness”).   
140 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
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Others frustrate the very nature of the sentencing inquiry.  Graham re-
peatedly stressed that juveniles’ plasticity and capacity for change makes 
judgments of incorrigibility at the time of sentencing especially sus-
pect.141  With juveniles in particular, we can never be fully confident that 
they are as bad, corrupt, depraved, or irredeemable as we might think in 
the short time after they have committed a serious crime. 
The structure of sentencing exacerbates these problems.  The one-
shot nature of the process means that the most important judgments 
are front-loaded to the time of sentencing.  The pressures described 
above feed into a system that then attempts to judge the most mallea-
ble offenders at a single point in time, without—to use Graham’s 
words—the “corroborat[ion]” of, say, later “prison misbehavior,” “fail-
ure to mature,”142 or any of numerous other factors that might help to 
reveal a juvenile’s “true character.”143  Indeed, Graham rested the need 
for a categorical rule on the inability of front-end sentencers—
including reviewing courts applying a case-by-case proportionality 
analysis—to distinguish “with sufficient accuracy” the truly “incorrigi-
ble juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for 
change.”144  Properly understood, this language does not refer to the 
difference between case-by-case and categorical judgments per se; pa-
role boards, after all, also make case-by-case judgments.  Instead, it is 
about the inability to determine an individual juvenile offender’s true 
nature at T1 without some notion of what characteristics he will exhibit 
long after, at T2.  When it comes to juveniles, in short, there are special 
reasons to doubt the trustworthiness of the moral judgments made at 
sentencing.145 
 
141 Id. at 2029-30; see also NELLIS & KING, supra note 131, at 32 (“A review of juvenile 
life without parole cases contradicts the general assumption that these sentences are  
reserved only for the most chronically violent youth, ‘the worst of the worst.’” (citing  
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES:  LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD 
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
sites/default/files/pdfs/therestoftheirlives.pdf)); Logan, supra note 131, at 716 (“[I]t is 
increasingly evident that the justice system has a highly uneven capacity to accurately 
assess juvenile competency, both for fitness to stand trial and punishment . . . .”).  
142 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.  
143 Id. at 2033. 
144 Id. at 2032.  
145 As Graham implied, this is even more true where the sentencing occurs relatively 
close in time to the commission of an especially heinous crime, before emotions have 
had a chance to cool.  See id. at 2032 (noting the “unacceptable likelihood” that a hei-
nous crime could overpower the mitigating aspects of youth (citing Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005))).  
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These reliability and individualization concerns stand in contrast 
to those of typical proportionality cases, which look to substantive con-
cepts like culpability and severity to flatly prohibit punishment at the 
outset.146  In the end, Graham eschewed any straightforward approach 
to substance.  The Court did not limit its uneasiness with juvenile sen-
tencing to any single substantive metric.  Errors in assessing future 
dangerousness, moral culpability, the potential for rehabilitation, and 
incentives for compliance all contributed to the decision.147  Nor did 
the Court limit which sentencing considerations might carry signifi-
cance decades after sentencing at a parole hearing.  It assumed that 
amorphous notions like depravity, irredeemability, incorrigibility, and 
character surely would carry weight.  Even the “demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation” that the Court mentioned as a substantive guide-
post for future parole inquiries does not narrow the universe of possi-
ble factors to be considered.148  How does one measure “maturity” and 
“rehabilitation,” exactly?  Very likely, a parole board attempting to do 
so would look at some mushy, underdefined combination of many of 
the things just mentioned:  evidence of depravity, irredeemability, in-
corrigibility, and other aspects of a juvenile’s “true character.”149  These 
traits cannot easily be tied to one clean substantive vision of punish-
ment, and the Court did not try to do so. 
Graham’s response to the reliability problem instead took the form 
of a procedural sentencing rule.  But Graham’s rule was a twist on the 
rule established in Woodson and Lockett.  Woodson and Lockett pursued 
fine-grainedness by diversifying sentencing across mitigating consider-
ations.150  Graham did so by diversifying sentencing across time and  
institutions.  At least in theory, Graham could have taken the Woodson/ 
Lockett approach.  Doing so would have required for juvenile life-
without-parole determinations the same individualized, holistic, and 
 
146 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
147 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (noting inherent difficulties in accurately deter-
mining whether a juvenile is “incorrigible,” and observing that despite Graham’s “esca-
lating pattern of criminal conduct, . . . it does not follow that he would be a risk to 
society for the rest of his life” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
id. at 2031 (discussing “the possibility that the offender will receive a life without parole 
sentence for which he or she lacks the moral culpability”); id. at 2032 (discussing the ef-
fect of life without parole on a juvenile’s “incentive to become a responsible individual”). 
148 Id. at 2030. 
149 See, e.g., Chanenson, The Next Era, supra note 6, at 450 & n.312 (2005) (observing 
that even when explicit criteria and principles exist to guide parole boards’ release 
determinations, their process is opaque, and the precise weight given to each factor is 
unclear). 
150 See supra notes 102-12, 120-22 and accompanying text. 
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case-by-case mitigation inquiry that is now de rigueur in capital cases, 
but is still haphazard at best in juvenile sentencing.151  The merits (or 
demerits) of the Court’s approach to capital sentencing, of course, are 
a subject of much debate.152  More to the point, it is not clear that bet-
ter-focused attempts at front-end individualization would do much 
good in the case of juveniles.  If the reliability problem stems in crucial 
part from the fact that it is too hard to know a juvenile’s true nature at 
the time of sentencing, loading more factors into the front-end sen-
tencing inquiry will not necessarily solve the problem.153  What is need-
ed is temporal individualization, a reassessment with the benefit of 
hindsight in the form of a constitutional “second look.”154 
To be clear, none of this is to say that Graham and Woodson/Lockett 
have nothing to do with substantive proportionality concerns.  On the 
most basic level, they clearly do.  Woodson/Lockett was not simply about 
avoiding mistakes in sentencing.  It was about avoiding mistakes in 
capital sentencing—mistakes in assessing who is the worst of the worst 
and therefore should be subject to the most severe penalty known to 
law.  The principle that the death penalty must be restricted to only 
the worst of the worst offenders, which the opinions in Furman v. Geor-
gia first embraced, is clearly a substantive proportionality principle.155  
 
151 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 4, at 82 (stating that courts have been “remark-
ably deferential” to states’ decisions about the extent to which sentencers must consider 
“youth as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of juveniles”).  
Chief Justice Roberts argued for a similar approach in his concurrence in the 
judgment.  But, instead of creating a new rule in the Woodson/Lockett vein, the Chief 
Justice would have folded the mitigation inquiry into Harmelin’s gross disproportionality 
test for noncapital cases, leaving to reviewing courts’ discretion exactly how to consider 
a juvenile’s particular mitigating circumstances in each case.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2040-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also Barkow, supra note 4, at 51-
52 (analyzing the Chief Justice’s approach).   
152 See supra note 95. 
153 Constitutionalizing a right to the presentation of mitigating circumstances for 
life without parole also would have required the Court to overrule its decision in Har-
melin, or at least explicitly to restrict it to adult offenders. 
154 See, e.g., Douglas Berman, Afternoon Keynote Address, Encouraging (and Even  
Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 429, 
437-38 (2010) (discussing second-look sentencing). 
155 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242, 249-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); see 
also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“[C]apital punishment must ‘be 
limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ 
and whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” (quoting 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005))); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 
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Woodson/Lockett and the Court’s other “super due process for death” 
cases laid out the procedures necessary to implement that principle 
reliably and accurately.156 
Graham might be reconceptualized in this way, as having both a 
substantive and a procedural side.  Graham’s substantive side rests on 
the proportionality principle that a life sentence—after Roper, now the 
most severe penalty available for juvenile offenders—must be restrict-
ed to only those truly deserving, worst of the worst juveniles.  Graham’s 
procedural side establishes the first broad contours of the constitu-
tional procedures necessary to make that individualized, morally relia-
ble assessment.  In doing so, it recognizes that, in light of the unique 
difficulties and uncertainties associated with sentencing juveniles, we 
cannot act with confidence until after some time has passed. 
III.  PAROLE AND THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING REGULATION 
Recognizing parole’s procedural significance does not provide a 
neat and tidy answer to every question that Graham raises.  But, by 
providing an alternative interpretive lens through which to view the 
decision, it does draw into focus some of the less obvious ways in which 
Graham fits within the constitutional landscape of sentencing.  This 
Part explores three ways in which Graham’s treatment of parole might 
broadly be seen as contributing to or heralding shifts in the future of 
constitutional sentencing regulation.  Section III.A explains how 
Graham continues Apprendi’s project of linking considerations of insti-
tutional design to punishment legitimacy by reallocating sentencing 
authority between institutional actors.  Section III.B emphasizes how 
Graham’s stretching out of the sentencing process breaks down tradi-
tional divides that separate front- from back-end sentencing and pro-
cedure from substance within sentencing, and broadens the 
substantive values that matter to sentencing itself.  Finally, Section 
III.C suggests how Graham’s approach to parole could lay the founda-
tion for the increased importance of sentencing explanations as a 
means of allowing reviewing courts to police back-end sentencing 
without drawing any hard substantive lines. 
 
(2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty must be reserved for the ‘worst of 
the worst.’”(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568)).   
156 See Lee, supra note 50, at 678, 679 & n.6 (discussing “super due process for 
death” cases); supra note 122. 
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A.  Linking Checks and Balances to Punishment Legitimacy 
Graham’s treatment of parole effectively extended the Wood-
son/Lockett individualization principle beyond the capital punishment 
context for the first time.  But it also continued a more recent trend in 
the Court’s sentencing jurisprudence of tying considerations of institu-
tional design to punishment legitimacy.  That trend began with Apprendi 
v. New Jersey’s linkage of Sixth Amendment jury rights to substantive 
crime definitions.157  Ring v. Arizona extended Apprendi to the sentenc-
ing phase in capital trials;158 Blakely v. Washington159 and United States v. 
Booker applied it to guidelines regimes.160  Graham approached the in-
stitutional issue from the other end and from a different constitutional 
provision, linking the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel 
and unusual punishments”161 to a constitutional requirement of back-
end sentencing review.  Whereas Apprendi shifted authority from judg-
es to juries at the front end of the process,162 Graham shifted authority 
from actors at the front end—be they legislatures, prosecutors, judges, 
or juries—to parole boards at the back end. 
Notably, Graham never stated why, or even if, the second look it 
required must come from a parole board.  This is a question worth 
asking.  The Eighth Amendment’s text, unlike that of the Sixth, leaves 
the issue wide open.163  If the goal is more textured, individualized, 
and morally reliable sentences, one must ask why the parole board ra-
ther than some other potential back-end sentencer—a judge, jury, ex-
ecutive, even prosecutor—gets the final call.164  Explicitly shifting back-
 
157 See 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). 
158 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
159 542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004). 
160 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005). 
161 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
162 At least, that is, in cases going to trial.  In the over ninety percent of criminal 
cases that are resolved through plea bargaining, Apprendi still shifts power, but the shift 
is not from judges to juries, but from judges to prosecutors (and, to a lesser extent, 
legislatures).  See Bibas, supra, note 7, at 465, 470-74. 
163 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”), with id. amend. VIII (“Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted.”).  
164 See, e.g., Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 407-10 (arguing for an increased 
role for juries in parole decisionmaking); Berman, supra note 154, at 437-38 (proposing 
that prosecutors be more directly involved in parole board decisionmaking); Joanna M. 
Huang, Note, Correcting Mandatory Injustice:  Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 
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end sentencing authority to any one of those bodies, of course, would 
have required substantial innovation.  Parole avoids those difficulties, 
and Graham may well have seized upon parole mainly because it is the 
most established and regularized mechanism for back-end sentencing 
that currently exists. 
Apprendi, however, suggests a potentially deeper motivation.  App-
rendi’s shift of power from judges to juries sought to further important 
separation of powers values by ensuring that juries could check prose-
cutors’ and judges’ punishment decisions.165  Juries are well positioned 
to do so because of their ability to inject “contemporary community 
values” into punishment decisions.166  As Justice Stevens—the author of 
the majority opinion in Apprendi—explained in Spaziano v. Florida, be-
cause juries “more accurately reflect the conscience of the community 
than can a single judge,”167 they are especially suited to making the tex-
tured, granular, and fundamentally normative judgments that give 
punishment decisions their “moral and constitutional legitimacy.”168 
Parole, at least in theory, performs a similar function.  Like the ju-
ry in Apprendi, parole injects an additional check into the sentencing 
process by fragmenting authority among different institutional actors.  
It does so through an institution that historically has engaged in the 
textured, granular, and individualized inquiry that true sentencing 
reliability requires.169  Relying on parole rather than, for instance, a 
 
60 DUKE L.J. 131, 152-57 (2010) (arguing for an increased role for judges in correcting 
unduly harsh sentences through executive clemency). 
165 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:  From Caveat Emp-
tor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (2011) (observing that Apprendi’s 
vision of juries as a check on judges and prosecutors was one of “strict, static separation 
of powers”); Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing:  Apprendi, the Offense of Convic-
tion, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 896-902 (2004) (explain-
ing Apprendi by reference to the institutional balance of power established in 
constitutional criminal procedure).  
166 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968).   
167 468 U.S. 447, 487 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
168 Id. at 483; see also Appleman, supra note 6, at 1311-21 (reviewing the link be-
tween the jury’s role as conscience of the community and punishment legitimacy in the 
Apprendi line of cases); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 943, 1033-34 (2000) (noting the role of the jury in ensuring fine-grained 
moral judgments); Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 437, 454 (2005) (same); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 
89 VA. L. REV. 311, 382 (2003) (arguing that “[b]ecause of its ability to render individu-
alized judgments and to reconcile conflicting views through deliberation rather than 
aggregation,” the jury is best suited to making democratically and morally legitimate 
sentencing judgments). 
169 See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. 
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judge-focused mechanism yields a system in which no single institution 
wields too much power:  legislatures make broad judgments about sen-
tencing ex ante; prosecutors make judgments during charging and 
plea bargaining; judges make more textured, retrospective judgments 
during sentencing at T1; and parole boards make further retrospective 
and individualized judgments during parole-board hearings at T2.
170  
Parole boards ideally also reflect to at least some degree the con-
science of the community, considering and filtering a range of input 
from affected community members and stakeholders.171  The resulting 
“moral and constitutional legitimacy” of the sentence flows both from 
the individualized, granular nature of the inquiry and the ultimate 
agreement among different institutional actors that comes out of the 
process by which punishment is imposed.172 
Whether this picture accurately reflects current realities is another 
matter.  While it seems clear that the Court had some such vision of 
parole and juvenile sentencing in mind, some of its assumptions about 
parole seem idealistic, outdated, or naive.  Many modern-day parole 
boards, for instance, see their job not as the individualized, character-
driven inquiry into redemption that Graham envisioned, but as the ex-
pert, data-driven management of actuarial risk.173  Instead of aiming to 
 
170 Cf. Berman, supra note 154, at 435-37 (connecting the disappearance of parole 
with a decline in checks and balances on sentencing). 
171 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text; see also O’Hear, supra note 6, at 
1279 n.174 (suggesting that parole boards may be at least as qualified as juries to act as 
“the conscience of the community”).  But see Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 
403-10 (arguing that parole boards do not have sufficient moral legitimacy to make the 
normative judgments inherent in parole release decisions). 
172 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  As this account suggests, Apprendi’s view of the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment thus shares a deep commonality with Woodson/Lockett’s view of the Eighth 
Amendment in that both ultimately seek to ensure morally appropriate sentencing 
determinations.  Justice Stevens and, more recently, Justice Breyer have implicitly rec-
ognized the connection, arguing that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing 
in capital cases precisely because of the jury’s ability to help safeguard against the im-
position of morally inappropriate sentences—the same feature that, according to Ap-
prendi, animates the Sixth Amendment jury right.  See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
613-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 
504, 515-26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467-90 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
173 See, e.g., Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 397-98 (discussing the role of 
risk in parole board decisionmaking); Stengel, supra note 20 (reviewing factors in-
volved in making parole release decisions); Jeremy Travis, Back-End Sentencing:  A Prac-
tice in Search of a Rationale, 74 SOC. RES. 631, 640 (2007) (suggesting that, in the modern 
era, parole decisions are primarily concerned with risk management).  
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do justice, they err on the side of denying release and protecting pub-
lic safety.174  The extent to which parole boards echo or embody the 
conscience of the community in making their decisions is also ques-
tionable.  As David Ball notes, parole board commissioners are usually 
appointed by the governor, and released parolees who reoffend “are 
not good news for gubernatorial incumbents.”175  Graham will—or at 
least should—force courts and policymakers to consider potential 
counterweights to these institutional pathologies.  Potential solutions 
could include increased and more formalized roles for victims, offend-
ers’ families, community members, and prosecutors; the advent and use 
of “parole juries”; and changes in methods of appointing, supervising, 
or incentivizing parole boards, such as requiring parole boards to rec-
ommend a specified number of prisoner releases every year or explicit-
ly to consider the net costs of imprisonment versus release when 
making release decisions.176  Such reforms would be in keeping with 
the spirit of the decision, even if not required by its letter. 
B.  Breaking Down Sentencing Barriers 
By tying the availability of parole to the legitimacy of punishment, 
Graham also broke down traditional barriers within sentencing.  The 
most obvious is the barrier between front- and back-end sentencing.  
Requiring multiple reviews during the process of sentencing means 
that sentencing is no longer a one-shot, static, unitary act.  It is an ex-
tended process, premised on the notion that some offenders might 
 
174 See, e.g., Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 398 (noting parole boards’ in-
centives to avoid releasing prisoners); Alexandra Marks, For Prisoners, It’s a Nearly No-
Parole World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR 
1261020 (surveying parole policies across time and states and describing the difficulty 
of countering political pressures against release). 
175 Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 398; see also Joan Petersilia, When Prison-
ers Return to Communities:  Political, Economic, and Social Consequences, FED. PROBATION, 
June 2001, at 3, 7 (“In most states, the chair and all members of the parole board are 
appointed by the governor; in two-thirds of the states, there are no professional qualifi-
cations for parole board membership.”). 
176 For an expanded discussion of some of these possibilities, see Ball, Normative El-
ements, supra note 6, at 406-10.  See also id. at 399-400 (proposing that parole boards 
consider net costs of imprisonment versus release); Berman, supra note 154, at 437 
(suggesting that criminal justice officials be given quotas, forcing them to recommend 
at least a small number of prisoner releases every year); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly 
(and Peculiarly) American “Revolution in Punishment Theory,” 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1120 
(2010–2011) (discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons’ sense of justice to 
parole release decisions); Petersilia, supra note 175, at 7 (discussing the “need to re-
think who should be responsible for making parole release decisions”). 
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outgrow or otherwise evolve out of their punishments and the original 
judgments that informed them.  While we might be able to pass judg-
ment on offenders with stable, well-formed characters, and to treat 
those ex ante judgments as presumptively reliable ex post, the same 
does not hold for juveniles and perhaps for others who have an inher-
ent and pronounced capacity for change.  Although the Court limited 
its holding to life sentences for juveniles who were not convicted of 
homicide, this logic could extend to juvenile life sentences for homi-
cide and perhaps to other mandatory minimums for juvenile offenders 
as well.177  Graham’s treatment of sentencing as a more holistic, drawn-
out process might also suggest more robust rights at the parole stage 
for access to counsel, more formal hearing procedures, and other pro-
tections that routinely attach to front-end sentencing, at least where 
punishments are sufficiently severe as to trigger Graham’s strictures.178  
Graham also further blurred the boundary between procedural and 
substantive sentencing considerations, as well as the boundaries 
among different types of substantive considerations.  The Court’s cou-
pling of procedural safeguards with substantive proportionality con-
cerns underscored the artificiality of the substance-procedure divide 
in both sentencing and Eighth Amendment theory; as Furman v. 
Georgia and the Court’s other early capital punishment cases made 
clear, the two cannot always easily be separated.179  And while the 
Court’s reliance on substantive proportionality law allowed it to ex-
pand existing doctrine only incrementally by hewing closely to Roper 
and Atkins, its use of the procedural, back-end remedy of parole also 
 
177 See Nilsen, supra note 4, at 69 (observing that all juvenile mandatory minimum 
sentences “do not afford any discretion to the sentencer based on individual character-
istics of the offender,” and so might violate Graham); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Man-
datory Minimums:  Don’t Give Up on the Court, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 67, 71, 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/denovo/OHEAR_2011_67.pdf 
(“Graham may also give grounds for juveniles (and perhaps others with deeply dimin-
ished culpability, such as the mentally retarded) to challenge lesser mandatory mini-
mums.”).  The Court is currently considering two follow-on cases to Graham that present 
the question whether sentencing juveniles convicted of homicide offenses to life without 
parole violates the Eighth Amendment.  See Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647 (U.S. argued 
Mar. 20, 2012); Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2012). 
178 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 86, § 26.4 (detailing due process protections pro-
vided during the sentencing process); cf. Appleman, supra note 6, at 1368-69 (arguing 
that Apprendi should apply to parole release and revocation decisions); Ball, Heinous, 
Atrocious, and Cruel, supra note 6, at 961-68 (arguing that Apprendi should apply to 
parole release decisions in California). 
179 See supra notes 122, 155-56 and accompanying text. 
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allowed it to avoid confronting and drawing lines around difficult 
substantive questions.  Is fifty years for juvenile nonhomicide too 
long?  How much weight can or should parole boards give to retribu-
tive, rehabilitative, and incapacitative considerations?  Should different 
considerations carry different weight at different points in the sentenc-
ing process, with, say, retribution receiving more weight up front?180  
What types of release opportunities—for example, compassionate re-
lease versus earned release—are necessary to satisfy Graham’s man-
date?181  The Court avoided these and similar questions, leaving it “for 
the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms 
for compliance,”182 while setting the stage for further interventions 
down the road.183 
 
180 Cf. Ball, Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 407-10 (proposing the parole jury as 
a mechanism to turn some of these normative questions over to the people).  
181 See John A. Beck, Compassionate Release from New York State Prisons:  Why Are So Few 
Getting Out?, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216, 227 (1999) (explaining the difference between 
compassionate and earned release and noting that, unlike earned release, “compas-
sionate release is not a mechanism to reduce the sentence of inmates who have some-
how paid their debt to society” and therefore “is justifiably viewed as a dispensation, 
rather than a right”).  Some courts already have begun grappling with these issues, 
asking, for instance, whether compassionate release programs satisfy Graham.  See Bell v. 
Haws, No. 09-3346, 2010 WL 3447218, at *9-11 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2010) (holding that a 
sentence of fifty-four years to life that would have made a juvenile prisoner first eligible 
for parole at age sixty-nine complied with Graham), vacated on other grounds sub. nom. 
Bell v. Lewis, No. 10-56405, 2011 WL 6364713 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2011); Angel v. Com-
monwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 401-02 (Va. 2011) (holding that Virginia’s compassionate 
release statute, which allows for conditional release after a prisoner reaches the age of 
sixty-five, satisfies Graham by providing a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”); 
cf. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 881 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a sen-
tence of eighty-four years to life imposed upon a juvenile violates Graham “because it 
amounts to a de facto sentence of life without parole”). 
182 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
183 The Court has taken a similar approach before.  Atkins v. Virginia prohibited ex-
ecution of the mentally retarded while “leav[ing] to the State[s] the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of 
sentences.”  536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)).  Panetti v. Quarterman refined the 
prohibition on execution of the insane announced in Ford v. Wainwright and rejected as 
inadequate the lower court’s procedures for determining insanity.  551 U.S. 930, 952 
(2007).  But Panetti reserved judgment on “whether other procedures, such as the op-
portunity for discovery or for cross-examination of witnesses, would in some cases be 
required under the Due Process Clause.”  Id.  As Carol and Jordan Steiker observe, this 
gradualist approach to implementing the Eighth Amendment might lessen opposition 
to the Court’s interventions while still allowing it to refine and announce both substan-
tive and procedural principles and to police outlier states for compliance.  Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia:  Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the 
Constitutional Regulation of Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 737-39 (2008); see also 
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At the same time, substantive considerations were not irrelevant.  
But by tying substantive considerations to the availability of parole, the 
Court embraced a broad, eclectic range of substantive values.  Propor-
tionality, as a doctrinal matter, no longer concerns only standard 
penological goals like deterrence and retribution.  It also recognizes 
amorphous and softer values like “self-recognition of human worth 
and potential,” “renewal,” and “reconciliation with society.”184  The 
Court’s acknowledgment that these concerns matter to punishment 
validity could encourage the creation of procedural spaces that foster 
forgiveness, reintegration, and healing as a legitimate part of criminal 
sentencing.185  It may even be that, as Graham’s implications unfold, 
courts will explicitly consider and weigh these values in assessing both 
states’ compliance efforts in general and parole boards’ decisions in 
individual cases. 
C.  Increasing the Importance of Sentencing Explanations 
Finally, Graham’s use of parole lays the foundation for the in-
creased importance of sentencing explanations at the back end of the 
sentencing process.  Despite the Court’s repeated reaffirmation of 
states’ discretionary powers over release decisions, and despite the in-
tentional mushiness of its substantive guideposts, the Court made clear 
that the required second look must be “meaningful.”186  The most nat-
ural way to enforce that command while still respecting states’ prerog-
atives would be for lower courts to insist on more robust back-end 
sentencing explanations, much as courts reviewing administrative 
agency decisions demand reasoned explanations but defer to an agen-
cy’s judgment regarding substance.187  Parole, with its regularized, ad-
 
Steiker, supra note 36, at 299-301 (discussing institutional costs and benefits of proce-
dural and substantive approaches to Eighth Amendment regulation). 
184 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
185 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 55, at 130-45 (discussing mechanisms, such 
as victim-offender mediation, by which criminal law could promote expressions of re-
morse, apology, and reconciliation).  The Court had hinted in the past that such values 
matter to the Eighth Amendment.  See sources cited supra note 94. 
186 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
187 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43  
(1983) (holding that a court reviewing agency action under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard should ensure that the agency has considered relevant data, statutory 
factors, and important aspects of the problem, but should not “substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency”); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO-
CESS § 7.5, at 407-13 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing review of agency reasoning). 
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ministrative processes, provides a comparatively good vehicle for that 
approach.188  As Michael O’Hear points out, such explanation review is 
“methodologically distinct . . . from the sort of substantive review ex-
emplified . . . by Eighth Amendment proportionality review,” asking 
only whether sentencers have justified their decisions without going 
further to ask whether those decisions could be justified at all.189 
How much of an explanation courts should require, and the rigor 
with which they should scrutinize the explanations they do receive, will 
need to be worked out over time.  Lower federal courts are currently 
grappling with similar issues in the front-end sentencing context in the 
wake of Rita v. United States, which established that within-Guidelines 
sentences in federal cases are presumptively reasonable, while leaving 
unsettled just how thoroughly those sentences must be explained un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).190  Whatever the resolution of that issue, it 
seems clear that the effectively pro forma explanations now common 
in parole proceedings should no longer be enough to satisfy Graham’s 
command.  At a minimum, courts should insist upon assurances that 
parole boards have engaged in the individualized, granular determina-
tions that Graham contemplated by considering and weighing evidence 
bearing on the offender’s specific circumstances.  While courts should 
not substitute their own substantive judgments for those of parole 
boards, they should police boards’ decisions for arbitrariness and un-
reasonableness.  This could mean, for example, requiring boards to 
identify the considerations that played the most important role in 
 
188 “Second-look” juries and executive clemency, by contrast, do not.  The former 
might bump up against the tradition of jury secrecy; the latter might bump up against 
separation of powers concerns and the prerogative of the executive to grant clemency 
for virtually any reason, including reasons that have little to do with the individualized 
considerations that Graham had in mind. 
189 Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentencing Explanations:  Learning from the 
Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) (discussing appellate 
review of trial court sentencing determinations).  As both O’Hear and scholars of ad-
ministrative law recognize, “at the margins, explanation review can shade into substan-
tive review, for an explanation cannot truly count as an explanation if some minimal 
standards of substantive rationality are not met.”  Id. at 752; see also PIERCE ET AL., supra 
note 187, § 7.6, at 417-20 (discussing differences between procedural and substantive 
review of agency decisionmaking, and noting that even procedural review can lead 
judges to take a position on the merits). 
190 551 U.S. 338, 354 (2007); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) (requiring a sen-
tencing judge, at the time of sentencing, to “state in open court the reasons for its im-
position of the particular sentence”); Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (“[W]e cannot read the 
statute as insisting upon a full opinion in every case.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining 
Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 469 (2009) (“Rita effectively transformed a re-
quirement for explicit explanation into a requirement for implicit explanation.”). 
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their decision, to discuss how those considerations influenced the de-
cision, and to respond to any significant arguments made by the of-
fender or his lawyer.191  It could also mean that courts reviewing a long-
serving offender’s case might insist on increasingly stronger justifica-
tions for a refusal to release as time goes by, particularly where the of-
fender had committed a nonviolent crime or where the victims, 
prosecutor, or community members either support or do not object to 
release.  Before Graham, some courts reviewing parole denials already 
had taken tentative steps down this path.192  Graham will likely acceler-
ate that development.  Increased use of back-end sentencing explana-
tions might eventually help to create a feedback loop between front- 
and back-end sentencers, further refining substantive proportionality 
norms and fleshing out the content and limits of concepts like restora-
tion and reconciliation.193 
 
191 See O’Hear, supra note 189, at 752 (arguing for such requirements in the context 
of appellate review of front-end sentencing); cf. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 187, § 7.6, at 
413-20 (describing similar requirements applicable to “hard look” review of agency 
decisionmaking); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sen-
tencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 47-49) (on file with au-
thor) (arguing for application of similar requirements to sentencing and the charging 
and plea-bargaining decisions that influence it). 
192 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (Cal. 2008) (holding that where “evidence 
of the inmate’s rehabilitation and suitability for parole . . . is overwhelming,” the “im-
mutable circumstance” of the original offense of conviction does not “inevitably sup-
port[] the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 546-47 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the state governor’s reliance on a “stale and static” factor in reversing the 
parole board’s grant of parole violated due process), vacated en banc, 603 F.3d 546 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a habeas 
claim resulting from denial of parole, but stating that “continued reliance in the future 
on an unchanging factor” could ultimately “result in a due process violation”), overruled 
by Hayward, 603 F.3d 546; Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 287 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding parole board’s repeated denial of parole based solely on the severity of the 
original crime without assessment of inmate’s current parole risk to be arbitrary and 
capricious); Gordon v. Alexander, 592 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(granting plaintiffs leave to replead procedural due process claim if they could allege as 
a factual matter that parole appeals were “governed by an unofficial policy or practice 
that effectively eliminates the possibility of parole for prisoners serving indeterminate 
sentences based on ‘stale and static factor[s]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hayward, 
512 F.3d at 546-47)). 
193 See Chanenson, Guidance from Above, supra note 6, at 189-94; Chanenson, The Next 
Era, supra note 6, at 381. 
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CONCLUSION 
Graham recognized the significance of parole—and, implicitly, 
back-end sentencing generally—to the constitutional regulation of 
punishment.  As I have tried to show in this Article, that significance 
cannot be understood solely in terms of substantive proportionality 
concepts like individual culpability and punishment severity.  It also 
encompasses broader procedural and institutional concerns that aim 
at more granular, individualized, and reliable sentencing—concerns 
not just over what sentences are, but also over who sentences and how.  
If taken seriously, Graham’s view of parole could result in more tex-
tured, considered, and just sentences, ones that seek not only to deter 
and condemn but also to further restoration, reconciliation, and other 
soft but important values the Court saw as being bound up in parole. 
But that is a big if.  Just as a myopic focus on substance can ob-
scure procedure, the reflexive use of procedure also can undermine 
substantive goals that procedure is supposed to serve.  The Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has a history of mixing the two in a 
way that is not always productive.194  In the case of parole, a black box 
of individualization, without more, could do more harm than good, 
giving front-end sentencers an easy out, pushing discretion into an 
even more opaque body, and making it seem as if life without parole 
punishments for juveniles are largely off the table when in fact no one 
is released.195  It is far too early to know whether the constitutional vi-
sion of parole suggested by Graham will be borne out.  But appreciat-
ing the complexity of parole’s relationship to the Eighth Amendment 
at least enables us to grapple more fully with the promises and pitfalls 
that lie ahead.  
 
194 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 183, at 725-30 (arguing that by deregulat-
ing the procedural means of enforcing Atkins’s prohibition on sentencing mentally 
retarded offenders to death, the Court has functionally impaired the prohibition it-
self); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 127, at 426-38 (arguing that the Court’s procedural 
regulation of capital punishment has done little to enhance the reliability or fairness of 
the death penalty while at the same time giving the appearance of meaningful judicial 
oversight). 
195 Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 183, at 733-34 (arguing that “the announcement 
of substantive rights that are undermined by ineffective procedures for implementing 
or enforcing those rights can be a particularly pernicious mode of constitutional regu-
lation” because it can cause the public to “believe or be persuaded that this country’s 
death penalty practices are less problematic than they really are”).  
